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Part I: Commentaries and Reflections
THE DEATH OF PENALTIES IN TWO LEGAL
CULTURES?
Professor Sarah Worthington QC (Hon) FBA*
1 Introduction
For anyone interested in private law in general, and commercial endeavours
in particular, the penalties jurisdiction is inherently fascinating. This is the
jurisdiction which entitles courts to review an agreed contractual term and
declare it void if it is a penalty. In the UK at least, a clause is a penalty
if, in substance, it imposes consequences for breach of contract that are
extravagant, exorbitant, unconscionable or out of all proportion to any
legitimate interest of the innocent party in performance of the contract.1
It is irrelevant that the parties have fully agreed to the term, or that its
inclusion has been priced into the contract.
The penalties doctrine thus throws into sharp relief the common assertion
that party autonomy and freedom of contract are important values in
common law systems. Those values are strong. As Lord Diplock put it
in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd:2
A basic principle of the common law of contract […] is that
parties to a contract are free to determine for themselves what
primary obligations they will accept. They may state these
in express words in the contract itself and, where they do,
the statement is determinative [and, turning to the common
* Downing Professor of the Laws of England and Fellow of Trinity College, University of
Cambridge. This is the lightly edited text of a lecture given in Melbourne and Sydney in
September 2016 during my term as Merralls Fellow, Melbourne Law School. I am grateful
for that opportunity, and the stimulating debates after the lectures. Some of the issues
considered here are addressed in more detail, in the UK context only, in a forthcoming
chapter: SWorthington, `Penalty Clauses' in GVirgo and SWorthington (eds), Commercial
Remedies: Resolving Controversies (CUP 2017).
1 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67,
[2016] 1 AC 1172, [32] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)), [152], [155] (Lord Mance), [291] (Lord Clarke), [293] (Lord Toulson). The law
in Australia is different: see the discussion below.
2 [1980] UKHL 2, [1980] AC 827, 848.
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law's default rules, he continued] if the parties wish to reject
or modify [those default] obligations which would otherwise
be so incorporated, they are fully at liberty to do so by express
words.
Yet this principle of party autonomy, however important, is not absolute.
The detailed constraints on its operation require some careful unravelling.3
The fascination of the penalties jurisdiction, however, is that even when
party autonomy does seem to be prioritised, in commercial contracts in
particular, the courts will still intervene to interfere with the substantive
arrangements agreed between the parties. This form of intervention is not
unique to penalties. Similar, if less dramatic, judicial oversight has also been
directed at exclusion clauses4 and express termination clauses,5 for example.
Indeed, Lord Diplock in Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank, described exclusion
clauses as `penalty clauses in reverse'.6
Note the territorial divide marked out by these areas of intervention. It
appears that parties are fully free to agree their primary obligations but
not their `remedial' obligations; they are fully free to occupy the space
where the law has no default rules, but not where they propose to override
the common law's default rules. Those default rules would have come
into play if the parties had been silent. But where the parties make their
own arrangements, then it seems the courts see a problem if the parties'
agreement is not closely aligned with the courts' own default rules. In those
circumstances, the courts may interfere to override the parties' agreement.
If such `blatant interference with freedom of contract'7 is to be defended
in principle and applied consistently in practice, then its rationale must be
exposed. Indeed, the UK Supreme Court (`the Court') in its most recent
3 I attempted that in SWorthington, `Common LawValues: The Role of Party Autonomy in
Private Law' in ARobertson andMTilbury (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence
and Unity (Hart Publishing 2016) ch 14.
4 Beyond the standard contract texts, see e.g. B Coote, Exception Clauses (Sweet and Maxwell
1964); J Morgan, Great Debates: Contract Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2012), especially 80-84.
5 Beyond the standard contract texts, see, e.g. M Bridge, `Freedom to Exercise Contractual
Rights of Termination' in LGullifer and SVogenauer (eds), English and European Perspectives
on Contract and Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale (Hart Publishing 2014);
J Randall, `Express Termination Clauses in Contracts' [2014] CLJ 113; S Whittaker,
`Termination Clauses' in A Burrows and E Peel (eds), Contract Terms (OUP 2007) ch 13;
H Beale, `Penalties in Termination Provisions' (1988) 104 LQR 355; J Carter, `Termination
Clauses (1990) 3 J of Contract L 90.
6 Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 1WLR 1428 (CA), 1446.
7 Cavendish Square Holdings BV v Makdessi [2013] EWCA Civ 1539, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm)
125, [44] (Christopher Clarke LJ).
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decision on penalties set precisely this question as its own homework.8
Other courts have attempted the same question. The answers to date are
widely recognised as falling short.9
The underlying difficulties are worth exploring, especially given the four
recent and highly significant judgments handed down by the highest courts
in the UK and Australia in recent years, with those two courts avowedly
adopting different approaches to the problem.10 What follows exposes
some of the issues. Adopting a rather journalistic style, the points are made
under six headings: What types of cases have reached the courts? How
have the courts approached the penalties rule in these latest cases? What
rationale underpins judicial intervention in penalties cases? Which clauses
are now amenable to review under the penalties jurisdiction? Which of
these reviewable clauses are likely to be held to infringe the penalty rule?
And, finally, what consequences follow upon such a finding?
2 What types of cases have reached the courts? Recent
judicial activity in Australia and the UK
What is a typical combined sense of fascination and ill-ease with the
penalties jurisdiction must now accommodate four cases from the highest
courts in Australia and UK, two from each jurisdiction. These cases have
profoundly changed the penalties landscape in the two countries. Their
very different facts provide a pointed illustration of the vastly different
contexts in which the penalties jurisdiction might have a role.
The Australians began the march. In 2012, in Andrews v ANZ Banking
Group Ltd,11 then this year in a follow-up appeal in Paciocco v Australia and
New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,12 the Australian High Court considered the
validity of various banking charges (confined specifically to late payment
fees in Paciocco) imposed by ANZ Bank on its customers.13
8 Makdessi (n 1) [3] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)) (`But unless the [penalties] rule is to be abolished or substantially extended [neither
of which was advocated], its application to any but the clearest cases requires some
underlying principle to be identified.').
9 ibid [3], noting that even the likes of Lord Eldon, Lord Justice Diplock and Sir George Jessel
MR had been unable to explain the jurisdiction, quoting Astley vWeldon (1801) 2 Bos & Pul
346, 350 (Lord Eldon); Wallis v Smith (1882) 21 Ch D 243, 256 (Sir George Jessel MR);
Robophone (n 6), 1446 (Diplock LJ).
10 The detail appears below.
11 Andrews v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 CLR 205.
12 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28.
13 In what follows, all the references to Paciocco are to this latest High Court decision (n 12),
not to the earlier Full Federal Court decision in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking
Group Limited [2015] FCAFC 50.
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In England, in 2015, the UK Supreme Court heard conjoined appeals
in Cavendish v El Makdessi and ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis,14 The first case,
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi, concerned a claim worth
~US$44m relating to contract terms which, on one view, defined the
sale price for shares delivering a controlling interest in an advertising
group, and, on another view, imposed a penalty for breach by the seller of
otherwise legitimate contractual restraint of trade clauses.15 The second
case, ParkingEye v Beavis, concerned an £85 parking ticket issued for
overstaying the permitted period of free parking in a shopping centre car
park.
These four cases hint at the broad range of factual circumstances which
might be amenable to oversight under the penalties jurisdiction. Earlier
cases across both jurisdictions are equally diverse. They illustrate penalties
claims being advanced in the context of fees charged for late completion of
contracts,16 breach of restraint of trade clauses,17 or breach of film screening
licences;18 interest rate hikes for breach of loan contracts;19 liquidated
damages for wrongful dismissal;20 and so on.
Those illustrations cover broad swathes of commercial activity. Yet one
ridermight be added to all of this. Despite my own expressed dissatisfaction
with the state of the law,21 assertions that a clause is a penalty are rarely
upheld by the courts. The assertions failed in all four of the recent
decisions under particular discussion here. They also failed in the vast
majority of leading decisions over the decades in both jurisdictions. Cases
where the penalties jurisdiction has delivered intervention are thus few
and far between, and each rare exception might in any event have been
14 Makdessi (n 1).
15 Makdessi agreed to sell to Cavendish a controlling stake in what had become the largest
advertising group in the Middle East. The agreement contained restrictive covenants
designed to ensure Makdessi did not compete in defined ways. Makdessi breached these.
As a result, under clause 5.1, Makdessi would forfeit the final two instalments of deferred
consideration payable by Cavendish for his shares. And under clause 5.6, he would be
required to transfer all his remaining shares to Cavendish at a price which excluded any
value referable to goodwill. Makdessi unsuccessfully claimed that clauses 5.1 and 5.6 were
unenforceable penalty clauses. The UK Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal,
which had in turn overturned the trial judge's conclusions.
16 Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41 (PC); Clydebank
Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1904] UKHL 3,
[1905] AC 6. Similarly, Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 71, (2005) 224
CLR 656; State of Tasmania v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] TASSC 133.
17 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1914] UKHL 1, [1915] AC 79.
18 Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Pty Ltd v Greenham [1966] 2 NSWR 717.
19 Lordsvale Finance plc v Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752.
20 Murray v Leisureplay plc [2005] EWCA Civ 963.
21 Worthington, `Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law' (n 3).
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better justified on alternative grounds.22 All of this might suggest that
contracting parties have little to fear from the jurisdiction and its potential
for interference with freedom of contract. But the waters which must be
negotiated are choppy, and perhaps choppier still after the last four years of
judicial hyperactivity.
3 How have the courts approached the penalties rule in
these latest cases?
If the courts have made the waters choppier, how have they done this? In
the four most recent cases in the highest courts in the UK and Australia,
neither jurisdiction overruled earlier cases, yet both jurisdictions have now
adopted a completely different view of the previously leading case on
penalties. That obviously has profound consequences. It is a stark reminder
that a turn in the road in applicable legal principles is not necessarily
signposted by an overruling of earlier authorities.
Before Andrews and Makdessi, the leading case on penalties was the House
of Lords' decision in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v New Garage and Motor Co
Ltd.23 There, the House of Lords had held that a retail price maintenance
clause with a fee of £5 per breach was a liquidated damages clause, not
a penalty clause. It was, therefore, a valid term of the contract, not
void as a penalty provision. In reaching this conclusion, one of the Law
Lords, Lord Dunedin, set out his guidance on the test for a penalty by
way of four numbered points, with the last point encapsulating a further
four sub-points.24 With all the attraction so often ascribed to numbered
lists, this test quickly achieved the status of a quasi-statutory code in the
subsequent case law.25 The full detail is not important here, but, taking
the highlights, Lord Dunedin suggested that `[t]he essence of a penalty is a
payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party [while,
by contrast,] the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted
22 The claim succeeded in Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [1962] AC 600 (HL), although
by contrast see Cadogan Petroleum Holdings Ltd v Global Process Systems LLC [2013] EWHC
214 (QBD (Comm)); Else (1982) Ltd v Parkland Holdings Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 130 (CA);
Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983] 2 AC
694 (HL); and Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476 (CA). And although relief was granted
inWorkers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573 (PC) (return of
a 25% deposit); Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1WLR 1026 (CA) (retransfer of shares on payment
default); and The Comr of Public Works v Hills [1906] UKPC 35, [1906] AC 368 (forfeiture
of a retention fund), all of these cases have some parallels with relief against forfeiture, and
might, therefore, be subject to preferable alternative explanations.
23 Dunlop (n 17).
24 ibid 86-88.
25 Makdessi (n 1) [22] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)).
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pre-estimate of damage […]' and that a provision `will be held to be penalty
if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and unconscionable in amount in
comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have
followed from the breach.'26
Notice that the test involves a simple opposition between a penalty and
a liquidated damages clause: the clause under review will necessarily be
one or the other. Moreover, classification under either head depends on
the degree to which the parties' nominated quantum differs from what
might be recovered byway of damages under the common law default rules.
Inherently, therefore, the relevant clause will be one which operates on
breach, and, to avoid being caught by the rule, any clause conditioned on
breach cannot provide for substantially more by way of liquidated damages
than the parties would have estimated as likely to be recoverable under the
common law default rules on damages.27 This resonates powerfully with
my earlier comment on the seeming need for the parties' own provisions
to align with the common law's default rules. Inevitably, of course, this
rule was subtly revised and adjusted to enable enhanced recoveries, thus
blunting the sharpness of the rule as originally stated by Lord Dunedin.28
Nevertheless, the fundamental drivers remained the same, and for present
purposes we can ignore the various subtleties and turn immediately to the
judicial activity of the last four years.
The four recent cases all substantially reinterpreted Dunlop. Without
exception, they did this not by overruling the case but by shifting their
focus from LordDunedin's formulaic approach (at least as expressed in later
cases) to Lord Atkinson's more pragmatic and commercially oriented one.
Lord Atkinson explicitly recognised Dunlop's wider interest in retail price
maintenance across all its retailers, not just its interest in the economic harm
caused by the particular breach of contract committed by the defendant
before the court. Earlier cases lent support to this move: consider the
courts' upholding of late payment clauses for the delivery of warships to
Spain,29 or the delivery of government infrastructure projects,30 without
requiring some demonstrated equivalent economic loss. The significant
shift in all these recent decisions was, therefore, explicit judicial recognition
26 Dunlop (n 17) 86-87.
27 See Robophone (n 6) 1446H-1447A (Diplock LJ) (there is a rule of public policy which does
not `permit a party to a contract to recover in an action a sum greater than the measure of
damages to which he would be entitled at common law'). See also Exports Credits Guarantee
Department v Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1WLR 399 (HL) 403 (Lord Roskill).
28 Those nuances are described in all the leading contract texts. See also the summary in
Worthington, `Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law' (n 3).
29 Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1904]
UKHL 3, [1905] AC 6.
30 Philips (n 16).
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of the existence of a broad range of non-financial interests that the parties to
a contract might legitimately protect.31
Although this explicit shift in focus from Lord Dunedin to Lord Atkinson
was common to both the UK Supreme Court and the High Court of Aus-
tralia, did both courts use that shift to advance the same ends? The courts
themselves suggested they did not, with each recognising divergences be-
tween their different approaches, and indeed doing so rather robustly. The
UK Supreme Court suggested that Andrews involved `a radical departure
from the previous understanding of the law',32 and refused to follow in
those footsteps. Responding tit-for-tat, the High Court of Australia sug-
gested that, `[t]o the extent that the statement refers to the common law
of Australia, the statement is wrong and appears to be based on a misun-
derstanding of Andrews.'33 I doubt the divide is as substantial as the courts
themselves suggest, but we will be in a better position to judge that at the
end of this analysis. For now it is enough to notice that both courts con-
ceded that contract terms might protect non-financial or non-monetary
losses.
But there was more. The Andrews decision departed from the previously
orthodox understanding of the penalty doctrine in two further significant
respects. First, it discarded the breach requirement. The advantage of
this is that it seems to avoid the problem of the parties being able very
simply to draft around the rule. But the change itself introduces its own
complications, which will be discussed further below.
Secondly, the High Court of Australia indicated that the doctrine had its
foundations in equity and those foundations remained active; they had
not withered and died in favour of the later-developing common law
rule.34 Pursuing this line, Paciocco makes it plain that both jurisdictions
are operational in Australia. Parties will generally rely on the common
law rules, but the equitable rules will assist in circumstances where the
doctrine is necessarily extended to cover non-breach situations, or where
performance is needed rather than damages or money. These are rare cases,
31 As an aside, in the context of case (re)interpretation, it is interesting to note the significance
ascribed in Paciocco to the use of the word `damage' rather than `damages' inDunlop, with the
former taken to be referring to wider interests, and the latter to the interests protected and
the sums recoverable under the common law default rules on damages: Paciocco (n 12) [145]
(Gageler J), [283] (Keane J). This was not determinative, but in any event seems to lay too
much stress on wording: judgments are not drafted as statutes, with each word amenable
to such forensic analysis.
32 Makdessi (n 1) [41] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)).
33 Paciocco (n 12) [121] (Gageler J).
34 ibid [123]. Also see more generally [122]-[126], which makes the points noted in the
accompanying text.
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as acknowledged in Paciocco. Indeed, the consideration of non-breach cases
in Andrews seems to be the only known modern instance. Paciocco itself
was recognised by the court as exclusively within the common law domain:
the banking fees clause operated on breach, and the only consideration was
whether the money payment provided for by way of late fees was penal or
not.
I remain unpersuaded by this suggested operation of the penalties jurisdic-
tion in equity. It seems to me that the early equity cases on penal bonds
all approached the problem on the basis that equity would (and could) only
intervene if the arrangement between the parties was specifically intended
as an agreement by way of security, and that equity had no jurisdiction if
the agreement was merely intended to quantify agreed damages or provide
an alternative secondary mode of performance of the contract.35 The legal
solution follows directly and inevitably from that particular characterisa-
tion of the agreed arrangement: enforcement of rights against the security
is barred beyond the interest which is secured. This view of the early eq-
uity cases seems to be reinforced, not undermined, by all the references to
the early equity cases in Paciocco itself. In this sense, equity's approach to
penal bonds shares much with equity's approach to relief from forfeiture in
that class of case where the forfeiture provision is inserted by way of secu-
35 So much is this the case that the courts themselves typically pose the characterisation ques-
tion as a simple opposition between clauses intended to define the parties' agreed quantum
of damages and clauses intended merely by way of security (usually for court-assessed de-
fault damages). Equity will not intervene in the first class, a conclusion reached without
further consideration of whether the agreed damages are excessive. By contrast, equity in-
tervenes in the latter class to ensure recovery is limited to the damages secured. The older
cases are often thin on reasoning, but see especially Sloman v Walter (1783) 1 Bro CC 418,
419, 28 ER 1213, 1214, with Lord Chancellor Thurlow saying that `the only question was,
whether this was to be considered as a penalty, or as assessed damages. The rule, that where
a penalty is inserted merely to secure the enjoyment of a collateral object, the enjoyment of
the object is considered as the principal intent of the deed, and the penalty only as acces-
sional, and, therefore, only to secure the damage really incurred, is too strongly established
in equity to be shaken.'
Similarly, see Sir Harry Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1721) Precedents in Chancery 568, 572;
24 ER 255, 257 and Tall v Ryland (1670) 1 Cases in Chancery 183, 184, 22 ER 753, 753
(the courts in both cases interpreted the parties' agreement as quantifying damages, not as
intending security, so there was no equitable intervention). To the same effect, but also
noting that any agreed damages clause must of course be properly agreed, see Roy v The
Duke of Beaufort (1741) 2 Atkyns 190, 192 (proper consent), 193-94 (security), 26 ER 519,
520 (proper consent), 520-21 (security) (although here the court did intervene, but on the
basis that there had been no breach to justify the damages payment). See too Rolfe v Peterson
(1772) II Brown 436, 442-3, 1 ER 1048, 1052 (no reasons are given, but presumably the
court accepted the argument of the winning side that relief was possible only when the
parties intended a security (442, 1052), and rejected the argument of the losing side that
equity would intervene simply because the terms were unfair or unduly onerous (442-43,
1052). Other cases cited in Paciocco (n 12) [21] (Kiefel J) are not on point.
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rity for performance of a primary obligation.36 The issue matters, if only
because any misunderstanding of the rationale for equity's intervention is
likely to lead to analytical problems down the track. With the High Court
of Australia, this is likely to be in its own assessment of potential infringe-
ments of the penalties jurisdiction. With the UK Supreme Court, it is likely
to be with its running together the possibility of reviewing clauses under
both the penalties jurisdiction and the forfeiture jurisdiction.37 For any eq-
uity lawyer, these are fascinating alleyways, but not of central importance
to this overview.
To summarise, the Australian position after Andrews and Paciocco might be
put like this. The High Court of Australia has made three quite significant
advances on the previously orthodox Dunlop rule: first, expanding the
rule beyond the penalties/liquidated damages direct comparator; secondly,
eliminating the breach requirement, and thus the ability to draft around
the rules with relative ease; and, thirdly, claiming a surviving equitable
penalties jurisdiction, giving the court added flexibility for intervention into
parties' arrangements. Interestingly, the first favours contracting parties in
the exercise of their own autonomy, but the latter favour increased judicial
intervention.
The seven-member panel of the UK Supreme Court inMakdessi pursued a
very similar tack. The Court also discarded Lord Dunedin formulations in
Dunlop in favour of the broader Lord Atkinson approach, suggesting that
this was not only a preferable approach, but also the dominant approach
of the House of Lords in Dunlop itself,38 although recognising that this
alternative approach had been lost sight of in favour of the focus on a
few enticingly numbered paragraphs in Lord Dunedin's judgment. By
contrast with the Australians, however, the UK Supreme Court explicitly
retained the breach requirement, refusing to follow the Australian lead,
and suggesting that the penalties jurisdiction was anomalous enough as it
stood without the Court volunteering to expand its potential application.39
Nevertheless, it conceded that this question of whether a clause was
36 Seemost recently Cukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013] UKPC
2, [2016] 1 AC 923; Cukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013]
UKPC 20, [2016] 1 AC 923.
37 This is a complicated issue, discussed in detail in S Worthington, `Penalty Clauses' in G
Virgo and S Worthington (eds), Commercial Remedies: Resolving Controversies (CUP 2017),
ch 16 (forthcoming), pt V.
38 See e.g. Makdessi (n 1) [22] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord
Carnwath agreed)) (`none of the other three Law Lords expressly agreed with Lord
Dunedin's reasoning, and the four tests do not all feature in any of their speeches').
39 ibid [13] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed)), see
also [239], [241] (Lord Hodge).
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triggered by breach should be judged as a matter of substance not form.40
This may in the end leave very little between the two jurisdictions on this
particular front.41 Going further, the Court has denied the survival of any
equitable penalties jurisdiction, treating the Australian analysis in Andrews
rather scathingly.42 But, as already noted, the Court seems to have tied itself
in very similar knots by suggesting forfeiture as an alternative secondary
review mechanism for some of these clauses.43
Both courts, in rejecting the liquidated damages/penalty clause dichotomy,
opted instead to focus on punishment, as indeed might be suggested by the
term `penalty' itself. Numerous paragraphs could be cited from the various
judgments, but all in one way or another describe the search as being one
for a clause which has the purpose, or even the sole purpose, of punishing
the counterparty rather than supporting the innocent party's legitimate
interests.44 In the search for punishment, it is also universally accepted that
the indicators `extravagant and unconscionable' (as per Lord Dunedin in
Dunlop), or exorbitant,45 or disproportionate,46 or `out of all proportion
to any legitimate interest',47 all remain material. It is perhaps worth
noting that while the High Court of Australia seemed set on expanding
the interventionist penalties jurisdiction, the UK Supreme Court expressly
considered whether the entire doctrine should be abolished. I had argued
for this, and remain of that view.48 However, the Court in Makdessi
adamantly declined to abolish the penalties rule either generally or in the
commercial context,49 with Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption adding:
40 ibid, [15], [34], [77] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)), [130] (Lord Mance); [258], [270], [280] (Lord Hodge).
41 Although the UK Supreme Court also admitted, a little inconsistently it might be thought,
that clever drafting might nevertheless enable an escape: ibid [43] (Lord Neuberger and
Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed)).
42 ibid [41].
43 See Makdessi (n 1) [17]-[18] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord
Carnwath agreed)); [160]-[161], [170] (Lord Mance); [227] (Lord Hodge); [291] (Lord
Clarke).
44 Paciocco (n 12) [165]-[166]; Makdessi (n 1) [31] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption
(with whom Lord Carnwath agreed) (`The real question when a contractual provision is
challenged as a penalty is whether it is penal, not whether it is a pre-estimate of loss. These
are not natural opposites ormutually exclusive categories. A damages clausemay be neither
or both. The fact that the clause is not a pre-estimate of loss does not therefore, at any rate
without more, mean that it is penal.').
45 Paciocco (n 12) [53] (Kiefel J).
46 Ringrow (n 16) [31]-[32] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ);
Paciocco (n 12) [54] (Kiefel J); Makdessi (n 1) [32] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption
(with whom Lord Carnwath agreed)) (`out of all proportion to any legitimate interest').
47 Makdessi (n 1) [32] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)); Paciocco (n 12) [54], [67]-[69] (Kiefel J).
48 Worthington, `Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law' (n 3).
49 Makdessi (n 1) [36]-[39] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
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`We rather doubt that the courts would have invented the rule
today if their predecessors had not done so three centuries ago.
But this is not the way in which English law develops, and we
do not consider that judicial abolitionwould be a proper course
for this court to take.'50
This is reminiscent of the Court's approach in Petrodel Resources Ltd v Prest,51
there declining to abolish the jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil, a
jurisdiction also existing elsewhere, but unable to suggest instances where
it was really needed and where no other intervention already did the job
equally well and on a more principled basis. It is easy to see why any court
might be reluctant to cede powers, especially since the circumstances where
they might prove useful in the future could be difficult to anticipate in the
abstract. But the approach adopted in Petrodel at least has the merit of
making the Court's views explicit, thus ensuring that few if any cases are
likely to advance `piercing' arguments to the court. The same is unlikely to
be true with penalties claims.
In short, both jurisdictions have formally upheld the authority ofDunlop but
radically reinterpreted its basis by moving from Lord Dunedin's technical
analysis to Lord Atkinson's more pragmatic and commercial analysis. Both
have liberalised the scope of the jurisdiction: the Australians, by eliminating
the breach requirement; the UK, by liberalising the form over substance
question and the varieties of detriment which might be reviewable. The
Australian courts have gone still further and embraced a revived equitable
jurisdiction to sit alongside the common law jurisdiction. Courts on both
sides of the equator deny that they have done anything radical, and yet the
general response of both practising and academic lawyers is certainly to the
contrary. The changes are hardly insignificant.
It is difficult to say what caused this sudden and rather dramatic move
on both sides of the globe. Reading history backwards, it might simply
have been the build-up to breaking point of the inherent tension between
party autonomy and judicial interference with genuinely agreed substantive
contractual terms, the discomfort over the technical formalismof the breach
agreed)), [162]-[170] (Lord Mance), [256] (Lord Hodge), [291]-[292] (Lord Clarke). For
suggestions that the penalties jurisdiction should be abolished, see J O'Sullivan, `Lost on
Penalties' [2014] CLJ 480; E Peel, `Unjustified Penalties or an Unjustified Rule against
Penalties?' (2014) 130 LQR 365; SWorthington, `Common Law Values: The Role of Party
Autonomy in Private Law' (n 3). And implicitly to the contrary, discussing the common law
more generally, see Lord Neuberger MR, `The Life of the Law: The Logic of Experience'
(Lionel Cohen Lecture, Jerusalem, 29 June 2010).
50 Makdessi (n 1) [36] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)); [291] (Lord Clarke).
51 Petrodel Resources Ltd v Prest [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415.
139
(2016) The UK Supreme Court Yearbook Volume 7
rule which seemed implicitly to deny a coherent motivating policy or
principle, all brought slowly to explosion point by a series of cases over
recent decades where the courts have strained to avoid intervention based
on the jurisdiction, pushing the analytical envelope as far as it was possible
to enable parties to adopt terms imposing default charges, interest rate
hikes, late payment provisions and more.52 Something clearly had to be
done to settle the jurisdiction on firmer and more principled foundations.
4 What rationale underpins judicial intervention in
penalties cases?
In seeking principled foundations for the penalties jurisdiction, what
conclusions did the courts advance in these four important cases? Perhaps
surprisingly, especially in light of its other radical moves, the High Court of
Australia did not really engage with this question other than to insist that
the real objection is to private punishment.53 But punishment suggests the
visiting of an unexpected detriment, and in all these contract cases which
incorporate `penalty' clauses, the detriment is clearly agreed and priced into
the contract, and so is hardly unexpected. Indeed, the more compelling
view might see the innocent party as being punished precisely because the
agreement is not enforced.
The UK Supreme Court fared no better. In Makdessi, the Court indicated
that the rule's underlying rationale is that a provision operating on breach is
unenforceable if its consequences are out of all proportion to any legitimate
interest of the parties.54 But this restates and reformulates the rule; it
does not provide a rationale. And even as a rule, it faces problems. If
this rule makes sense, then surely it would make still more sense to refuse
enforcement of any provision if its consequences are out of all proportion
to any legitimate interest of the parties. But where would that get us? And
surely themost basic `legitimate interest' of contracting parties lies in having
the lawuphold the terms of their arrangements provided they arewithin the
law and properly agreed?
Effectively, therefore, the courts are saying that such arrangements, even
if properly agreed, are not `within the law'. So we are full circle – the
divide between primary and remedial provisions seems important to the
52 See e.g. Lordsvale (n 19); Leisureplay (n 20); Cine Bes Filmcilik ve Yapimcilik AS v United
International Pictures [2003] EWCA Civ 1669; Philips (n 16).
53 Paciocco (n 12) [254]-[256] (Keane J).
54 Makdessi (n 1) [29] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)), but generally too.
140
The Death of Penalties in Two Legal Cultures?
courts,55 but for reasons which they cannot explain, and which still seem to
me to be inexplicable. This failure to nail the underpinnings of the penalties
jurisdiction will undoubtedly have consequences: it is impossible to deal
with hard cases if the relevant principles and policies are unclear.
However, despite this lack of clarity, the courts still have a job to do. They
must decide which contract terms are legitimately within their sightlines as
potential penalties, and – from that class –which should then legitimately be
judged to be penal. These are the issues addressed in the two final questions.
5 Which clauses are now amenable to review under the
penalties jurisdiction?
Given all the differences just outlined, it might seem surprising that the
courts in the UK and Australia seem to have adopted remarkably similar
tests to determine which contract terms are reviewable under the penalties
jurisdiction. In Australia, the High Court's discussion is of contracts
which contain `primary stipulations' and `collateral stipulations', with the
collateral stipulation not necessarily operative only on breach of the primary
stipulation.56 In the UK, the Court's discussion is of contracts which
contain `primary obligations' and `secondary obligations', with a secondary
obligation necessarily arising on breach of the primary obligation if review
under the penalties jurisdiction is to be attracted.57
On reflection, however, some notion of alternative primary and collateral
stipulations (in Australia) or primary and secondary obligations (in the UK)
is inevitable; otherwise, the penalties jurisdiction has nothing on which to
bite. It cannot bite on a single stipulation defining a mode of performance.
Such a stipulation is at large, and non-performance would necessarily be
remedied by the common law's own default rules. By contrast, clauses
amenable to the penalties jurisdiction must necessarily provide for an
alternative to the default rules: it is these agreed alternatives which may,
sometimes, be scrutinised, and on scrutiny held to be void despite being an
agreed arrangement between the parties.
Notice the consequences, however. With a red line through the offending
alternative stipulation, the consequence is that only the primary stipulation
55 ibid [13] (`There is a fundamental difference between a jurisdiction to review the fairness
of a contractual obligation and a jurisdiction to regulate the remedy for its breach. […] the
courts do not review the fairness of men's bargains either at law or in equity. The penalty
rule regulates only the remedies available for breach of a party's primary obligations, not
the primary obligations themselves.').
56 Andrews (n 11) [10] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ)).
57 Makdessi (n 1) [40]-[43] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)), [129]-[130], [153] (Lord Mance).
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stands, and, if it is not complied with, then the innocent party will
necessarily be left to claim damages under the common law's default rules
on damages.58 Even phrasing the analysis like this highlights a potential
complication. The court's intervention must be such that it is reasonable
to take away one limb of the parties' own agreed alternative modes of
performance – i.e. the collateral or secondary stipulation – and leave the
primary stipulation as a self-standing sole mode of performance, in the
absence of which the innocent party will be left to damages assessed under
the common law's default rules.
It was precisely this concern that caused the UK Supreme Court to refuse
to follow the Australians down the no-breach route. The Court saw the
jurisdiction to interfere as inappropriate in circumstances where the parties
had genuinely laid out alternative modes of performance. In that latter
category, the Court put take-or-pay causes, bad leaver clauses, break fee
clauses, and such like,59 implicitly suggesting that these clauses could be
interpreted as alternative primary obligations, not remedial secondary ones.
It is thus crucial to know which alternatives will count as reviewable
`collateral' or `secondary obligations' and which as unreviewable `primary',
but alternative, options. The penalties jurisdiction turns on the difference.
Before Andrews and Makdessi, the distinction was purely a matter of form:
an obligation worded as conditional on breach was open to scrutiny; the
same obligation avoiding that phraseology was not. This was, quite fairly,
seen as yet another fundamental flaw in the penalties jurisdiction because it
made plain that the jurisdiction operated on a technicality rather than in a
principled manner.
Now, however, something more subtle must be relied upon. The problem
was addressed inMakdessi, but not in Andrews or Paciocco. InMakdessi, the
Court recognised that the parties might provide for genuinely alternative
modes of performance. They called these `primary obligations' and `con-
ditional primary obligations' (conditional on non-performance of the first
primary obligation).60 The problem is, of course, obvious. The structure
or phraseology of the proffered contractual options reveals nothing: this is
the structure of all primary/secondary options, as well as all primary/con-
ditional primary options. Furthermore, the contract terms themselves typ-
ically reveal indifference as to the choice to be made between options. And
58 This is the practical result. There are subtle differences in how this is achieved in both
jurisdictions. Interestingly, the two jurisdictions differed in their approaches before these
latest cases, and now still differ, with each having swapped to the other's earlier preferred
approach.
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no test could turn on the subsequent (and likely self-serving) assertion by
the promisee that there was no factual preference for one mode of perfor-
mance over the other.61 Such a test would in any event fly in the face of the
concessions in both Andrews and Makdessi that deterrence is a permitted
and valid part of contracting.
Nevertheless, Makdessi held that there was a distinction, and that it
mattered. If the penalties jurisdiction is to work, then this distinction
must be applied to protect certain alternatives from review. Yet even
the seven Justices of the Court who invented the distinction could not
themselves agree uponwhether the various provisions in theMakdessi share
sale were conditional primary obligations (i.e. redefining the sale price
and reshaping the primary relationship between the parties) or secondary
obligations (i.e. defining the remedial consequences following a breach of
the primary obligations) and so opening up the possibility of review under
the penalties jurisdiction.62 This clearly will not do if commercial parties
and their lawyers are now to be required to draw these very same lines.
The High Court of Australia did not address this issue directly, but precisely
the same problem is likely to arise given the very precise wording adopted
in Andrews in describing primary and collateral stipulations.63
In short, in both jurisdictions the only clauses reviewable under the
penalties jurisdiction are some defined subset of `then' or `or' clauses
appearing in contracts worded either as `if not X, then Y' (meeting the UK
breach requirement) or `either X or Y' (meeting the broader Australian
test, and perhaps falling foul of the UK substance over form test). But
in both jurisdictions it is unclear how this subset is to be identified; it is
unclear which clauses will be classed as `secondary obligations', or `collateral
stipulations', and which will not.
This problem seems insoluble. To me, it indicates a flaw in the logic
which is otherwise presented so attractively in both Andrews andMakdessi.
When one party fails to perform under the first option in a contract, is
61 Equally the test of whether the clause being reviewed is penal does not depend on any proof
that one party intended to punish the other: ibid [28]; Paciocco (n 12) [242] (Keane J).
62 See Makdessi (n 1) [73]-[88] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord
Carnwath agreed)), [180]-[183] (Lord Mance), [270] and [280] (Lord Hodge), [291] (Lord
Clarke), [292] (Lord Toulson). A useful summary of the divisions on the different clauses
is provided byW Day, `Penalty Clauses FollowingMakdessi: Postscript' [2016] JBL 251.
63 Andrews (n 11) [10] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (`In general terms,
a stipulation prima facie imposes a penalty […] if, as a matter of substance, it is collateral (or
accessory) to a primary stipulation in favour of a second party and this collateral stipulation,
upon the failure of the primary stipulation, imposes upon the first party an additional
detriment, the penalty, to the benefit of the second party. In that sense, the collateral or
accessory stipulation is described as being in the nature of a security for and in terrorem of
the satisfaction of the primary stipulation.').
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there any test which can determine whether the second option is, at law,
a `collateral stipulation' or `secondary obligation' (thus reviewable under the
penalties rule) or a `conditional primary obligation' (merely providing an
alternative mode of performance, and therefore not reviewable)? And yet
the distinction is said to be crucial.
The approach adopted in the Makdessi judgments is that the distinction
turns on whether the initial primary obligation is mandatory (so failure
constitutes a breach, and the second option is then remedial and secondary)
or permissive (so failure does not constitute a breach, and the second
option is therefore an alternative conditional primary obligation).64 But
this distinction is tenuous. If the contract itself provides for an alternative
mode of performance, then the primary obligation cannot be mandatory in
the sense which seems necessary here, and the suggested distinction falls
away.65
How did we get into this muddle? Some part is simply terminology,
and using words without thinking carefully about their significance. On
any sensible analysis, the agreed contractual obligations in these penalties
contexts are surely all primary obligations. The parties agree who will
do what, and when they will do it, and what will count as proper
performance. All contractual obligations are inherently conditional. That
is what consideration requires: if A does X, then B will do Y. This
does not stop the obligations being primary. Adding complications by
providing for performance alternatives does not change this principal point.
Despite the added complication, these too are all primary obligations agreed
by the parties. The difference between them is simply their different
conditionalities.
True secondary obligations really are different. They may be imposed by
the courts or agreed by the parties. On the first, the relatively modern
jargon is to speak of primary obligations under a contract, and secondary
obligations arising upon breach of those primary obligations. The use of the
term `secondary obligations' in this context defines a liability to a range of
judicially imposed default remedies, being a different source of obligations,
and has nothing to do with the penalties jurisdiction.
Secondary obligations agreed by the parties are different again. Agreements
to provide security fall into this category. So do insurance contracts. These
64 Makdessi (n 1) [14] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)), but contrast [280] (Lord Hodge).
65 Notice one interesting question, however. If a threatened breach of the initial primary
obligation is discovered early enough, would a court order injunctive relief (e.g. in relation
to restraint of trade or non-disclosure clauses) or specific performance (e.g. in relation to
timely transfer of assets)? The answer to that question cannot, however, be determinative
of the answer to the question in issue here.
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agreements themselves specify primary obligations between the parties, but
their protective objective is secondary in that the required performance
is necessarily defined and quantified by some other (primary) obligation.
These obligations are properly secondary in that they are supportive only,
and fall away completely if there is no underlying primary obligation.
These obligations also have nothing to do with the penalties jurisdiction.
Many illustrations could be given. Forfeiture cases very often fall within
this category (and in these circumstances any suggested overlap with the
penalties rule seems doubtful). As suggested earlier, it seems to me that
the penal bonds which provided the genesis of the equitable penalties
jurisdiction also fall into this category.66
There are no analogies between these types of secondary obligations and
the distinctions the judges are seeking to identify between `primary' or
`conditional/alternative primary' and `collateral' or `secondary' obligations
in the types of contracts before the courts in the penalties jurisdiction.
Whatever the judges say about how obvious these distinctions are,67 there
is, I suggest, no legal or practical substantive distinction in play at all.68 I
would prefer to say that all these choices describe primary obligations.
On the test adopted in both Andrews and Makdessi, this would leave the
penalties jurisdiction with no content. That would be no bad thing in my
view. But it makes plain that if the penalties jurisdiction is to have teeth,
and if the courts are not to tie themselves in knots in finding secondary or
collateral clauses to review, then they may be forced to take the opposite
stance. They may be forced to say that every time a contract provides for
alternative modes of performance, then the courts will regard one mode as
primary and the other as secondary. Which of the two should be regarded
as primary and which as secondary might need to be explained: one clause
will be reviewed and perhaps declared void; but not the other, whatever its
onerous characteristics. This makes plain the radical judicial intervention
in play under the penalties jurisdiction.
66 See above, (n 35). To similar effect, see Makdessi (n 1) [4]-[7] (Lord Neuberger and Lord
Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed)), citing AWB Simpson, `The Penal Bond
with Conditional Defeasance' (1966) 82 LQR 392.
67 See especially ibid, [13] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)) and [130] (Lord Mance) ('a real distinction, legal and psychological'), notwith-
standing their own failure to achieve consensus.
68 As Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption said in a different context, `the law relating to
penalties has become the prisoner of artificial categorisation': ibid [31].
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6 Which reviewable contract terms will be held to be penal?
Having established a jurisdiction to intervene, the court must then decide
whether the identified `secondary' or `collateral' obligation in their sightlines
is penal. The test is simple. The secondary obligation must not impose
a detriment which is `out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of
the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation',69 or
`exorbitant or unconscionable when regard is had to the innocent party's
interest in the performance of the contract',70 or some similarwording. The
High Court of Australia in Paciocco put it even more strongly: the primary
objective of the clause must not be punishment, rather than securing some
legitimate interest.71
All this may have made sense under the earlier penalties rule, but it
makes little sense now that the courts have conceded that deterrence is
acceptable.72 The essence of deterrence is presenting an option which
the counter-party will seek to avoid, and one which will, therefore, seem
punitive if applied. So much is this so that ParkingEye makes it plain that
deterrence can be the sole objective of the engagement, in that case the
deterrence of overstaying motorists. It is hard to overstate the significance
of this move for the penalties jurisdiction. An explicit recognition that
parties may have a legitimate interest in performance, not merely in
compensation for non-performance,73 means that there is no longer any
simple opposition between a clause which imposes punishment, even one
69 ibid [29], [32] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed));
Andrews (n 11) [75] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Paciocco (n 12)
[32], [52], [54], [57], [67]-[69] (Kiefel J), [269]-[270] (Keane J).
70 Makdessi (n 1) [241], [255] (Lord Hodge); similarly, see [152] (Lord Mance). The onus of
proof is on the party in breach: [143] (Lord Mance). See also [31]-[33] (Lord Neuberger
and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Clarke agreed)), [162] (Lord Mance), [293] (Lord
Toulson). Also see Paciocco (n 12) [29], [34], [53] (Kiefel J) (immaterial if the sum specified
is `only egregious'), [54] (Kiefel J), [330] (Nettle J).
71 Paciocco (n 12) [32] (Kiefel J), [158], [165]-[166] (Gageler J), [253], [271] (Keane J). But
Keane J expressly recognises that this inquiry is fraught once the protection of parties' wider
interests is accepted: [216]. See also Makdessi (n 1) [31], [77], [82] (Lord Neuberger and
Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed)), [243], [251], [278] and [282] (Lord
Hodge).
72 Makdessi (n 1) [23], [28], [75], [81], [82], [98]-[99] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption
(with whom Lord Carnwath agreed)), [172], [198] (Lord Mance), [248], [271]-[278],
[282], [285] (Lord Hodge); Andrews (n 11) [75] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel
and Bell JJ); Paciocco (n 12) [30], [57] (Kiefel J), [161]-[166] (Gageler J), [270] (Keane J).
73 This is not to deny the advantages of a liquidated damages clause. These are common,
and such contracts are unlikely in practice to come before the court for review under the
penalties jurisdiction. This was true under the old penalties rule, and remains true. By
contrast, litigated penalties cases invariably reflect objectives going beyond recovery of
compensation.
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with the primary objective of imposing punishment,74 and one which
secures some legitimate interest.
But although deterrence is now possible, the adopted deterrent must not
be wholly disproportionate or exorbitant or unconscionable in view of the
interest in performance which is being protected.75 Judicial assessment of
this is undoubtedly made easier by the wide margin of appreciation allowed
to the parties. Nevertheless, in assessing contractual terms against this
new standard of acceptability, there is now no easy benchmark provided
by compensatory damages.76
This new context requires a sea change in judicial approach to the review
exercise. Under the old Dunlop rules as understood – or perhaps misunder-
stood – for such a long time, a penalty was any secondary obligation which
required the offending party to pay a sum that was extravagant and un-
conscionable in comparison with the greatest provable economic loss that
could conceivably flow from breach of the primary obligation.77 The num-
bers on either side of the ledger were clear. It made no difference that the
parties had consented to the extravagance, nor that their contractual objec-
tives went beyond recovery of compensatory damages. This rule attracted
its own subtle accretions, especially in relation to the extent of the permitted
deviation from normal contract damages,78 and, more recently, the possi-
bility that there might be acceptable commercial79 or social80 justifications
for deviation from the compensatory norm. But all that is now gone.
Now the focus must simply be on whether the chosen scale of punishment
is excessive in the light of the legitimate interests being protected by the
contract term. But then the entire edifice seems to collapse under the
straightforward logical inconsistency in one party insisting that a term in
a contract is `extravagant and unconscionable' or a `punishment', when it is
no more than the parties have properly consented to and priced into their
agreement as the terms of their deal at the time of contracting. The only
ground for complaint ought to be that their agreement is apparent, not real.
In practice, although of course they do not say this expressly, the courts
seem to have come pretty close to applying their own test in just this way.
74 As in ParkingEye (n 1).
75 See (nn 69, 70, 71).
76 See the explicit recognition of this by Keane J in Paciocco (n 12) [216].
77 Dunlop (n 17); Makdessi (CA) (n 7). By contrast, a secondary obligation which merely
provided for a reasonable pre-estimate of the likely loss would survive as a liquidated
damages clause. For literature on this earlier rule, see the authorities cited inWorthington,
`Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law' (n 3).
78 AMEV UDC Finance Ltd v Austin [1986] HCA 63, (1986) 162 CLR 170, 193 (Mason and
Wilson JJ); Philips (n 16).
79 Lordsvale (n 19); Leisureplay (n 20); Philips (n 16); United International Pictures (n 52).
80 ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] EWCA Civ 402 (CA) [30] (Moore-Bick LJ, V-P).
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In both Paciocco and ParkingEye, the courts took notice of the fact that large
numbers of people used the banking facilities and the parking centre and
thus impliedly confirmed that the fees were reasonable.81 But a test of
`reasonableness' seems more appropriate in applying consumer protection
statutes than penalties rules. Taking another tack, the courts were further
reassured that the claimants before the court had consciously elected to use
the bank's services, and indeed sail close to the wind in exposing themselves
to the risk of having the relevant fees and charges imposed on certain
occasions. But this seems to prove no more than that there was an agreed
contract incorporating well-advertised, understood and utilised optional
terms. These factors relate to proper consent, not to assessment of the penal
quality of the term in issue.
InMakdessi, the problem is even more difficult and the solution even more
obvious. In judging the parties' alternative terms, there are no consumer
markets, no repeat transactions, no obvious benchmarks. Without these,
courts are inevitably thrown back on the wisdom of the parties themselves,
having tested that they too have truly consented to the deal in question. As
Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption put it:82
These [the precise contract terms] are matters for negotiation,
not forensic assessment […] They werematters for the parties,
who were, on both sides, sophisticated, successful and expe-
rienced commercial people bargaining on equal terms over a
long periodwith expert legal advice andwere the best judges of
the degree to which each of them should recognise the proper
commercial interests of the other.
This describes a search for proper consent, not an exercise in judicial
assessment of whether a clause is penal.
Perhaps trying to keep the genie in the bottle, Lord Sumption suggested
in his oral handing down of the Makdessi judgment that parties do not
normally have a legitimate interest in performance or deterrence beyond
the recovery of compensation for breach.83 In short, his Lordship suggested
that these cases are rare. But, to the contrary, a surprising number
81 Other objective comparators might provide further support for that conclusion, as with
the analogous statutory parking fines for public car parks considered as comparators in
ParkingEye (n 1).
82 Makdessi (n 1) [75] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)).
83 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi (UK Supreme Court, Case ID UKSC
2013/0280, Judgment Summary, 4 November 2015) <www.supremecourt.uk/watch/uksc-
2013-0280/judgment.html> accessed 14 November 2016.
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of contracts fall into Lord Sumption's rare category. In every penalties
case, actual performance is regarded as more important than the market
value of obtaining performance: consider contracts designed to ensure
attendance and participation, or timely delivery, or business continuity, or
strict confidentiality; alternatively, consider contracts designed to protect
the value of underlying assets (as in Makdessi and Dunlop) or to ration the
distribution of limited assets (as in ParkingEye). Whenever parties agree to
prescribe alternative modes of performance, one alternative is frequently
designed to deter deviation from selection of the other.84 This is certainly
true of all the leading penalties cases.85
But the real difficulties in assessing whether a clause is penal go well beyond
this. Even judged hypothetically, how can courts sensibly decide whether
a properly agreed deterrent term in a contract is wholly disproportionate
or exorbitant or unconscionable in view of the interest in performance
which is being protected, when the courts cannot articulate what the
overly-deterred victim is being protected from? It is surely not simply
protection from the punishing payment of an exorbitant sum, as the
relevant protective rules would then need a much broader reach, extending
well beyond review of a restricted class of `secondary obligations' or
`collateral stipulations'.
Take a simple illustration. Neither the court nor the common law default
rules on damages will rescue a contracting party who has agreed to pay
double the market price for an asset. Why then should the penalties rules
protect a party who has agreed to pay the market price by Friday, or double
the market price if paid later? All that really matters, surely, is whether
each agreement has proper consent. To that end, it is undoubtedly true
that `tough terms' will likely alert the court to the need for rigorous forensic
assessment of the validity of consent.86 But is anything more than that
warranted? In short, assuming there is proper consent, should the party
to the first contract be left to suffer and the party to the second rescued? If
so, why?
84 This is not to suggest that the alternative category is empty of content. Opportunities to pay
in cash or by debit or credit card may express no preference as to which the payee prefers
(although notice that the options are often priced slightly differently).
85 And in almost every single one the court concluded that the clause was valid, and not a
penalty: consider Dunlop (n 17); Philips (n 16); Lordsvale (n 19); United International Pictures
(n 52); Leisureplay (n 20); Andrews (n 11);Makdessi (n 1); Paciocco (n 12).
86 See SWorthington, Equity (2nd edn, OUP 2006) ch 7. In the end it may be better to return
to the analysis adopted in the early equity cases in this area. Overly onerous remedies simply
raised an inference that the compromised party had not properly agreed to the particular
term: there was an inference of impaired consent. An approach that relies on procedural
unfairness, rather than substantive unfairness, is both easier to implement and easier to
justify.
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This is simply another way of making the point that judicial insistence on a
thorough review of `secondary obligations' or `collateral stipulations' which
impose deterrents looks all the more odd when judged against other types
of clauses which equally incentivise or deter, yet are never subjected to
substantive review: consider discounted prices for early payment, insurance
concessions for safe operators, legal security arrangements, termination
clauses, forfeiture clauses, and so on. All these clauses are only ever
subjected to procedural review to confirm that there is proper consent to
their terms.
This is all a rather longwinded way of saying that it seems odd that vendors
are completely free to reach agreements which settle the purchase price
at punitive levels, which will then be fully protected by the common law
default rules on damages. By contrast, although a contract can deal in and
protect commercial and practical interests which cannot be measured in
compensatory damages, the parties to these types of contracts cannot make
their own arrangements as to pricing of the incentives or deterrents which
promote performance.
7 What consequences follow if the secondary or collateral
clause is penal?
If a clause is found to be a penalty, then it is void.87 In this respect,Makdessi
has altered the law in England & Wales. In the past, a penalty clause was
unenforceable to the extent that it was penal;88 now it is simply void. Of
course, if the clause is not a penalty then it is enforced to full effect. This was
the case with all the clauses in Andrews, Paciocco,Makdessi and ParkingEye.89
Interestingly, the High Court of Australia in both Andrews and Paciocco
suggests that `partial voidness' is the appropriate outcome if the clause is
held to be penal in Australia under the equitable branch of the penalties
doctrine rather than the common lawbranch.90 This looks dubious. Indeed,
the analysis adopted to reach this conclusion seems instead to reinforce the
suggestion made earlier that all these equity cases are not penalty cases,
but are instead agreed security arrangements between the parties, and the
87 Makdessi (n 1) [9], [84]-[87], (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord
Carnwath agreed)), [283] (Lord Hodge), [291] (Lord Clarke), [292] (Lord Toulson).
Similarly, AMEV UDC Finance (n 78), 192-3 (Mason andWilson JJ).
88 Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1WLR 1026 (CA).
89 Andrews (n 11); Paciocco (n 12);Makdessi (n 1); ParkingEye (n 1).
90 Andrews (n 11) [60] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Paciocco (n 12),
especially [247]-[248], [252] (Keane J).
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appropriate remedies follow necessarily from that.91 This security analysis
in the equitable context is also espoused by the Court inMakdessi.92
8 Conclusion
A pessimist might say that the law on penalties is now far more uncertain
than it was in 2012. To that extent, one should heed the old adage
to be careful what you wish for. Several headline points can be made:
Dunlop remains a leading precedent, but with focus retrained on Lord
Atkinson rather than Lord Dunedin; courts in both the UK and Australia
now recognise that modern contracts can be legitimately structured to
protect far more than immediate financial interests; in both jurisdictions,
there is an avowed liberality in relation to what contracting parties may
agree in relation to their primary obligations, but an unexplained and
unjustified paternalism in relation to the parties' secondary or collateral
obligations; this distinction persists even though in practical terms it now
seems impossible to distinguish between these two categories of terms.
I am tempted to go further and suggest that although neither the UK
Supreme Court nor the High Court of Australia has formally abolished the
penalties rule, in creating this profound ambiguity they have in substance
achieved the same ends. Of course, given my views, I should regard that as
a positive outcome. But vestiges of the jurisdiction remain, and neither the
UK Supreme Court nor the High Court of Australia have managed to nail
a rationale for the penalties rule. This means that any difficult distinctions
must be drawn without any clear sense of principle or purpose. This will
inevitably create problems for the future.93 But given the direction of travel
in both jurisdictions, it will at least, I suggest, be a deeply shared, if difficult,
future.
91 See (n 35).
92 Makdessi (n 1) [84]-[87] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath
agreed)).
93 With luck, the courts will simply continue to hold that properly consenting parties are
generally the best arbiters of what they want, and will leave matters to them, just as they
have done for most of the past century in this area.
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